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Abstract A tension has long existed between those
biologists who emphasize the importance of adaptation by
natural selection and those who highlight the role of phy-
logenetic and developmental constraints on organismal
form and function. This contrast has been particularly
noticeable in recent debates concerning the evolution of
human language. Darwin himself acknowledged the exis-
tence and importance of both of these, and a long line of
biologists have followed him in seeing, in the concept of
‘‘descent with modification’’, a framework naturally able to
incorporate both adaptation and constraint. Today, the
integrated perspective of modern evolutionary develop-
mental biology (‘‘evo-devo’’) allows a more subtle and
pluralistic approach to these traditional questions, and has
provided several examples where the traditional notion of
‘‘constraint’’ can be cashed out in specific, mechanistic
terms. This integrated viewpoint is particularly relevant to
the evolution of the multiple mechanisms underlying
human language, because of the short time available for
novel aspects of these mechanisms to evolve and be opti-
mized. Comparative data indicate that many cognitive
aspects of human language predate humans, suggesting that
pre-adaptation and exaptation have played important roles
in language evolution. Thus, substantial components of
what many linguists call ‘‘Universal Grammar’’ predate
language itself. However, at least some of these older
mechanisms have been combined in ways that generate
true novelty. I suggest that we can insightfully exploit
major steps forward in our understanding of evolution and
development, to gain a richer understanding of the princi-
ples that underlie human language evolution.
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Adaptation  Exaptation  Constraints  Spandrel 
Phenotypic plasticity
Introduction
Although our brain represents the main adaptive feature of
our species, what it is adapted to is not clear at all.
Franc¸ois Jacob (1977)
After many years of neglect, the evolution of human
language has recently become a very active field of inter-
disciplinary research. Biologists, linguists, psychologists,
neuroscientists, anthropologists, computer modelers, and
many others have begun working together, and considerable
empirical progress has been made on some components of
language (for example, speech perception and production, or
the neural basis of syntax perception). A general conception
that language must be conceived as composed of multiple
semi-independent components, rather than a monolithic
‘‘organ’’, has begun to take hold. Along with this, various
conceptions of ‘‘protolanguage’’ have been clarified: hypo-
thetical systems, during past periods of hominin evolution,
that possessed some but not all of the mechanisms typifying
modern language. Today, various long standing approaches
to language evolution can be conceptualized as different
models of protolanguage, and arranged in sequence to offer a
specific trajectory from our extinct common ancestor with
chimpanzees to modern Homo sapiens (cf. Fitch 2010). In
particular, it is increasingly widely agreed that some com-
ponents of language have homologues or analogues in other
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species, and can thus be studied comparatively, while others
are probably unique to our species. The increasing focus
today is on testing the various hypotheses on the market with
diverse empirical data, rather than the speculative story-
telling for which the field was so long ridiculed.
Despite some real progress, the field is nonetheless
characterized by major unresolved controversies, and one
suite of issues in particular will occupy me here. Is lan-
guage an adaptation, marked as such by its many superbly
functional details, which develop optimally in our species
and in no other (Pinker and Bloom 1990)? Or is language,
in contrast, a hodge-podge of ancient mechanisms, tinkered
together into a barely-functional Rube Goldberg device
(Jacob 1977), an example of what Francis Crick called a
‘‘frozen accident’’ (Crick 1968)? Is human language best
characterized by its continuity with other aspects of cog-
nition and/or communication, and preexisting primate
precursors (Hockett and Ascher 1964), or is discontinuity
the rule (Premack 2007)? Are some aspects of language,
such as the Merge operation of syntax, characterized by
near-perfect optimality in a way that cannot be explained
via evolutionary ‘‘tinkering’’ (Chomsky 2010)? Is human
language basically a special case of a more general, human
specific adaptation for shared intentionality and cultural
learning (Tomasello et al. 2005)? Such issues have been at
the forefront of recent debates about the nature of language
and its evolution (Andrews et al. 2002; Hauser et al. 2002;
Fitch et al. 2005; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005; Sza´mado´
and Szathmary 2006; Botha 2011).
I have suggested elsewhere that each of these viewpoints
is likely to be correct for certain components of language,
but not for others (Fitch 2010). The appearance of conflict
among them is deceiving, for in each case proponents of a
specific perspective on language focus on a different
component of language. These differences of focus are
often obscured by the use of one term, ‘‘language’’, to refer
to different mechanisms or processes. I define ‘‘language’’
as a system which allows virtually any thought an organism
can conceive to be expressed as a complex signal, and
allows others possessing the system to interpret that signal,
recreating the original concept. Further, I advocate a multi-
component approach which sees this capacity as composed
of multiple interacting subsystems, rather than a single
monolithic whole. This contrasts with the common ten-
dency to seek a single key feature that defines language.
Many components of language will be shared with
various other species, but some may be unique derived
features of humans (Hauser et al. 2002; Fitch 2005, 2009b).
According to current information, several components of
human language required substantial evolutionary change
during the transition from our last common ancestor with
chimpanzees, who lived about 6 million years ago in
Africa, to humans. These include adaptations for signaling
(e.g. vocal imitation), for semantics (e.g. advanced Theory
of Mind, and a drive to share meanings), and for syntax
(e.g. recursive combinatorial operations). Scientists court
unnecessary confusion and fruitless debate if they fail to
distinguish among these different mechanisms, or single
out one as the key defining ingredient of language.
In this paper, perhaps controversially, I will suggest that
any component of language, even the most novel and
apparently adaptive, needs to be characterized within a
context of historical constraints, deriving from develop-
mental and phylogenetic constraints on form and physiol-
ogy. Since Darwin, the importance of such constraints has
been widely recognized by biologists, and to morphologists
and developmental biologists in particular. Thus, to sci-
entists trained in evolutionary biology, much of what I say
below may seem obvious. It is nonetheless important to
make these points explicitly, when discussing the evolution
of cognition, because scientists studying cognition come
from diverse disciplinary backgrounds (e.g. psychology,
linguistics, neuroscience, anthropology…) and thus may be
unaware of the value of a broad and pluralistic approach to
evolutionary explanation in which constraints play a cen-
tral role. This danger is exacerbated by the widespread
focus of contemporary evolutionary psychology on adap-
tive optimization to hypothetical ‘‘problems faced by our
Pleistocene ancestors’’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1990;
Symons 1992; Pinker 1997; Buss et al. 1998) and a relative
reluctance to incorporate historical and developmental
constraints into evolutionary theorizing.
In keeping with the evo-devo theme of this issue, I will
suggest that now is a particularly opportune time to begin
more thoroughly incorporating historical constraints into
our thinking about the evolution of cognition, because of
the revolution in molecular developmental biology, and the
fusion of evolutionary theory and developmental biology
that has resulted. Today, for the first time in history, we can
begin to ground such relatively vague traditional notions as
‘‘phylogenetic constraint’’ in terms of specific develop-
mental processes that employ well-understood gene net-
works and molecular interactions. As a massive and
unexpected bonus, these developmental genetic processes
turn out to be very widely shared among animals, allowing
us to gain insights from nematode worms or fruit flies that
are directly relevant to human development and evolution
(Gehring and Ikeo 1999; Carroll et al. 2005; De Robertis
2008). Biologists are finally in a position to cash out
Darwin’s ideas about ‘‘correlations of growth’’, Bateson’s
notions of developmental discontinuity, or Gould’s ideas
about allometry, neoteny and exaptation in specific mech-
anistic terms (cf. Gould 2002). Evo-devo has given sub-
stance to these ideas that, although venerable, have long
had an uncomfortable whiff of wooliness or even mysti-
cism about them. My goal here is to show that, when trying
614 Evol Biol (2012) 39:613–637
123
to make sense of the complex palimpsest that is the modern
human brain, cognitive scientists interested in evolution
have much to gain by incorporating these insights, and
much to lose by ignoring them.
Constraints and Exaptation in Human Cognitive
Evolution
In two seminal papers, Steven Jay Gould and his colleagues
clarified several important concepts underpinning what
Gould termed a ‘‘pluralistic’’ perspective in evolutionary
biology (Gould and Lewontin 1979; Gould and Vrba
1982). These three interlocking concepts are exaptation,
constraints and spandrels. While the rhetorical charge of
these papers led, initially, to considerable controversy, by
now these concepts and this perspective have been inte-
grated into normal ‘‘textbook’’ evolutionary biology (e.g.,
Ridley 1997). Furthermore, the pluralistic perspective has
been embraced profitably by working evolutionary biolo-
gists in many fields, including human evolution, generating
new testable hypotheses [reviewed in (Andrews et al. 2002;
Pievani and Serrelli 2011).
Exaptation captures the notion that evolved traits can
change their function, being (in Darwin’s terms) co-opted
from an old function to some new one. Constraints is a
covering term for diverse factors that prevent natural
selection from fully optimizing a given trait to its function,
and that thus restrict, limit, or scaffold the course of evo-
lution and the nature of evolved trait. Because of con-
straints, selection on one trait may lead to changes in other
traits that are not adaptive, but are merely correlated with
the selected traits. When such non-adaptive traits appear
due to physical or developmental constraints, Gould &
Lewontin suggested the term spandrels, by analogy to
geometrically necessary aspects of architecture. Spandrels
in the biological sense are non-adaptive by-products of
developmental processes, sometimes present by physical
necessity. Exaptation can occur in two forms. In the first,
an adaptive structure constructed by natural selection for
one purpose can be put to new use—a form of ‘‘adaptation
recycling’’. In contrast, type II exaptations co-opt previ-
ously useless spandrels for some use, giving rise to a true
novelty. In both cases, it is likely that eventually natural
selection further hones and refines certain aspects of the
‘‘new’’ trait, which then constitute bona fide adaptations to
the new function. Thus there is no a priori incompatibility
between these concepts: in the pluralistic perspective all of
them will play a part in evolutionary explanation, with their
respective roles to be sorted out empirically, on a case by
case basis.
The broad acceptance of a pluralistic perspective on
evolutionary explanation by biologists stands in sharp
contrast to recent debates about human cognitive evolution,
and language evolution in particular. Receptions run the
gamut from the enthusiastic embrace of exaptationist
thinking by some (Gould 1991; Tattersall 2004; Chomsky
2010) to skepticism or vigorous rejection by others
(Dennett 1995; Buss et al. 1998; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005;
Bickerton 2010; Botha 2011). Recent attempts at synthesis
have highlighted the need for precise hypotheses and evi-
dentiary standards in evaluating this debate (Andrews et al.
2002; Botha 2011; Fitch 2011a; Pievani and Serrelli 2011).
There can be little doubt from this literature that the
value of the pluralistic perspective in understanding human
cognition, and language evolution, remains disputed. Part
of this is a matter of time: acceptance of this perspective in
biology required the specification and empirical testing of
clear exaptive hypotheses (e.g., Poe et al. 2007). By
comparison, the study of human cognitive evolution
remains in its infancy. In a step towards this goal, in a
companion paper to this one I have specified three specific,
testable hypotheses concerning the evolution of spoken
language and its neural underpinnings (Fitch 2011a).
However, part of the problem seems to be a deeper
symptom of interdisciplinary exchange and mutual mis-
understanding, particularly of the importance of evolu-
tionary constraints in biological explanation. It is this
problem that I focus on here.
Evo-Devo and the Panglossian Paradigm
A core issue in the ongoing debate about constraints and
adaptation in cognitive evolution concerns the proper role
of the concept of adaptation by natural selection in evo-
lutionary explanations. One camp, prominent among evo-
lutionary biologists, stresses that adaptation is an ‘‘onerous
concept’’ to be invoked only after other explanations (e.g.
historical accident, random drift, and the like) have been
empirically rejected (Williams 1966b; Gould and Lewontin
1979; Ahouse 1998). The other camp, prominent among
evolutionary psychologists, advocates adaptation as a
default assumption (Dennett 1983; Pinker and Bloom 1990;
Dennett 1995; Buss et al. 1998; Andrews et al. 2002;
Pinker and Jackendoff 2005). This camp suggests that
adaptive hypotheses must be rejected empirically before
other non-adaptive alternatives can be entertained. This is
an epistemological issue, concerning the proper way to
practice evolutionary biology and apply it to the human
mind.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett provides a compelling
metaphor, based on chess, to support his contention that
adaptation in general, and optimal design more specifically,
deserve the status of default assumption in evolutionary
theory (Dennett 1995). In chess, stronger players often give
an advantage to beginners by forfeiting a piece (a knight,
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bishop or even queen) to help even the game. Imagine,
suggests Dennett, that instead the stronger player decides to
restrict their possible moves (e.g. no diagonal moves by
queens, never moving a piece twice in a row), and write this
constraint down at the beginning of play, but does not tell
their opponent. How then should the opponent determine
what this self-imposed constraint is? By comparing the
actual moves to the optimal moves, and noting any dis-
crepancies between them. This, argues Dennett, is how
evolutionary biologists should proceed as well. Mother
Nature does not write down the constraints, and since we
cannot ‘‘read’’ the restrictions directly, we should assume
that evolution is optimal, until obtaining clear evidence to
the contrary. By this argument, we can only obtain evidence
for non-adaptive hypotheses by considering and testing all
plausible adaptive hypotheses (for further argument and
endorsement of this view see Andrews et al. 2002).
There are two core problems with Dennett’s chess met-
aphor. First, in chess we can assume that the opponents goal
is to win the game: we know what ‘‘optimality’’ means. If
the player was acting to prolong the game, or with a per-
verse attachment to rooks, the proposed optimality strategy
would fail. In nature, of course, the goal of the trait (its
putative adaptive function) is precisely what is being
debated. The second problem is the assumption in the
metaphor that the opponent cannot read the rules restricting
the constrained player. But the core benefit of studying
development, particularly in the broad comparative frame-
work favored by modern evo-devo, is that we can ‘‘read the
rules’’ and understand the constraints by directly studying
developmental processes, and also understand historical
processes based on phylogenetic inference. Hijacking
Dennett’s metaphor, in modern developmental biology we
often can peek directly at the constraining rules. When this
is possible it is a far more productive way to proceed than
laboriously employing the ‘‘optimality gambit’’.
Thus, I conclude that recent progress in biology supports
the traditional viewpoint of (Williams 1966b) that adaptation
is an onerous concept to be invoked only after a pluralistic set
of plausible non-adaptive hypotheses (chance, constraints,
spandrels, exaptation, phenotypic plasticity) have failed.
Obviously, a solid evidential basis is necessary to accept or
reject any scientific hypothesis, and hypotheses about con-
straints are no exception. But I will argue that we will make
far more rapid progress in understanding human cognition by
grounding evolutionary hypotheses in developmental, phy-
logenetic and ontogenetic data than we would by restricting
ourselves to adaptationist arguments about optimal function.
Outline
The rest of this paper has three parts. In the first part, I take
a historical perspective to clarify the distinction between
adaptation and evolution, and illustrate the fundamental
importance of constraints in understanding evolution.
Much of the current debate in evolutionary psychology
fails to distinguish evolutionary explanations (which
include phylogeny, constraint, and developmental bias as
key components) from adaptive explanations (which focus
nearly exclusively on the optimizing function of natural
selection). I argue that well-established biological fields,
including molecular biology and functional morphology,
provide better role models for future cognitive biology
(following, for example, Jacob 1977; Maynard Smith
1978b; Lauder 1990) than does the current incarnation of
evolutionary psychology. I illustrate this contention with
examples from morphology and genetics, and show that by
using a comparative phylogenetic approach, we can dis-
tinguish local adaptation to problems specific to a species,
from traits reflecting global constraints applicable to a
much broader set of organisms. By distinguishing local
adaptations, involving immediate problems a species faces
in its current environment, from global design constraints
(e.g. the Bauplan of its phylum), we can make the concepts
of adaptation and constraint both more precise, and more
explanatory.
In the second half of the paper, I suggest that the
clarification of the dual concepts of adaptation and con-
straint, coupled with a vastly improved understanding of
developmental and phylogenetic constraints provided by
evo-devo, has important implication for the study of
language evolution. This perspective finds its roots in the
‘‘tinkering’’ metaphor of Franc¸ois Jacob (1977), the plu-
ralistic perspective on biological inquiry of Tinbergen
(1963), and the acknowledgement of constraints champi-
oned by Gould and Lewontin (1979). An evo-devo
framework has room for both continuity and change, and
can naturally incorporate both key innovations, adapta-
tions sharpened by natural selection, and the phenotypic
limitations inherent in our phylogenetic starting point. I
initially explore several examples of increasing relevance
to human language evolution, considering two aspects of
human morphology that provide illustrative examples:
bipedalism and the speech apparatus. I then turn to the
evolution of human cognition, again providing several
well-researched examples from neuroscience. These
examples show how cognitive biology can embrace a
pluralistic perspective on adaptation, avoid the overly
simplistic dichotomies implicit in much current debate in
language evolution, and enrich our understanding of lan-
guage and cognition. I end by sketching an approach
to language evolution that incorporates the insights of
evo-devo and the mechanistic nature of constraints on
evolution, arguing for what I term an ‘‘exaptationist’’
perspective, which sees evolution as a cascade of exap-
tations and adaptations.
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Part 1: Evolutionary Constraints and Adaptation
Evolution and Adaptation: A Historical Prelude
Thus throughout nature almost every part of each
living being has probably served, in a slightly mod-
ified condition, for diverse purposes, and has acted in
the living machinery of many ancient and distinct
specific forms (p 284 Darwin 1877)
Two themes—of common descent and adaptive
design—play a recurring role in Charles Darwin’s writings.
Darwin provided abundant data supporting the fact of
evolution, highlighting the linked themes of ‘‘descent with
modification’’ and phylogenetic constraints throughout his
writing. He emphasized the many useless ‘‘vestiges’’ or
‘‘rudiments’’ found throughout nature, such as the human
vermiform appendix, as clear evidence of constraints on the
process of evolution, and evidence against any all-know-
ing, globally optimizing Creator. As a result of Darwin’s
emphasis of these facts, the idea that biological traits, and
species, evolve by descent with modification, became
widely accepted within 10 years of the publication of the
Origin of Species.
Darwin’s second core concept was adaptation: that the
process of natural selection leads organisms to be
remarkably well-suited to their ways of life, and thus
‘‘well-designed’’ in an engineering sense. Unlike con-
straints and common descent, this concept was already
widely accepted in Victorian England long before Darwin
wrote the Origin, because it had been emphasized by the
natural theologians as evidence for the existence of a
Creator (e.g., Paley 1826). Darwin thus had no need to
convince readers of the existence of many ‘‘remarkable
contrivances’’ which reflect excellent design. In the Origin,
his purpose instead was to provide a non-deistic explana-
tion of such design, which Darwin and Wallace famously
provided with their theory of natural selection. Unlike
descent with modification, the importance of natural
selection was not well-accepted in Darwin’s time, and by
the early 1900s natural selection was seen by many sci-
entists as an outdated Victorian idea, with little explanatory
power (cf. Ridley 1997). It was not until the neo-Darwinian
synthesis of genetics and evolution occurred that natural
selection was rescued from disrepute, and elevated to its
current status as a prime mover in evolutionary change.
But even this elevation was only partial, and remains a
topic of ongoing debate among biologists. For example,
today, the widely-accepted ‘‘neutral theory’’ of molecular
evolution holds that most variation in protein and DNA
sequences is a result of random drift, rather than natural
selection (Kimura 1983). However, the degree to which the
neutral theory is actually true, rather than a simple null
hypothesis to be falsified in many cases, remains debated
(cf. Graur and Li 2000; Wagner 2008). More generally,
many biologists have emphasized the importance of
developmental constraints on the evolutionary process
(Gould 1977; Gould and Lewontin 1979; Maynard Smith
et al. 1985; Gottlieb 1992; Goodwin 1996) and argued for a
need to incorporate developmental biology into a richer
and more pluralistic evolutionary theory.
In the last three decades, the explosive growth and
explanatory success of evo-devo has begun to accomplish
precisely this rapprochement between evolutionary theory
and developmental biology (Bonner 1982; Raff and
Kaufman 1983; Alberch 1989; Gilbert 2003; Carroll 2008).
In the process several traditional, but somewhat vague,
ideas about evolutionary and developmental constraints
have been successfully sharpened and given a firm footing
in the molecular mechanisms of development. In particular
the old notion of ‘‘internal constraints’’ on variability (e.g.,
Whyte 1965), where powerful selection against untenable
mutations happens, during development in ovo or in utero)
can now be more clearly understood in terms of genetic
pleiotropy at the level of core developmental mechanisms,
and as the result of mutually-constraining interactions
within complex genetic networks (see below).
In constructing and testing evolutionary explanations, it is
crucial to distinguish the reality of evolution and common
descent, which no biologist doubts, from the importance of
natural selection, which has been a topic of continuing debate
since 1859. Unfortunately, this critical distinction between
evolution (the constrained general process) and adaptation
(one specific component or result of this process) is fre-
quently disregarded in discussions of human cognitive evo-
lution, and particularly language evolution. Yet the existence
of many sources of evolutionary constraint on adaptation
(genetic, developmental, allometric and phylogenetic) is a
fact, recognized by all practicing evolutionary biologists (cf.
Maynard Smith et al. 1985). Natural selection may lead to
local optimality, among some set of immediately-available
phenotypic options, but global optimality is neither required
nor expected in evolutionary theory (Jacob 1977; Maynard
Smith 1978a).
Darwin himself made his awareness of the distinction
between evolution (descent with modification) and adap-
tation (optimization by natural selection) crystal clear in the
Introduction to the Origin, writing ‘‘I am fully convinced
that species are not immutable … Furthermore, I am con-
vinced that natural selection has been the most important,
but not the exclusive, means of modification.’’ (Darwin
1859), using non-adaptive traits like ‘‘rudimentary organs’’
and ‘‘vestiges’’ as some of the strongest evidence against the
omnipotence of natural selection. Useless traits like the
human appendix or external ear muscles, male nipples,
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rudimentary wings in flightless insects or a rudimentary
pelvis in snakes are clearly not adaptations to any current
function, but nonetheless have evolved. It was obvious to
Darwin that such ‘‘vestiges’’ do not constitute adaptations,
but rather are simple reflections of phylogenetic history. Of
course, a functional appendix or tail is adaptive in many
species, but in humans they are simply remnants of an
ancient developmental programme. Their very lack of
usefulness in our own species is what made them such a
powerful argument for evolution, and so important for
evolutionary theory. Furthermore, Darwin clearly recog-
nized that adaptation often leads to convergent evolution,
which may obscure lines of common descent. The stream-
lined form of dolphins and fish is a convergently-evolved
solution to the fluid dynamic problems of swimming rap-
idly. Their superficial, adaptive similarity should not blind
us to the fact that dolphins are mammals, not fish.
Nonetheless, a tendency towards pan-adaptationism has
been characteristic of much recent work on cognitive
evolution, particularly regarding language evolution, and
this has led to a voluminous and increasingly devastating
critique of the notion of ‘‘adaptation’’ as it is used in the
evolutionary psychology literature (e.g., Gould 1991;
Laland and Brown 2002; Buller 2005; Richardson 2007).
One recent book enlarges the scope of the critique to all of
evolutionary biology (Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini, 2010).
If the entire biological study of cognition—‘‘cognitive
biology’’ hereafter—is to avoid being tarred with the same
brush as evolutionary psychology, it is important to address
and rebut these charges head on.
Fortunately, as I will show, this is not hard to do. Con-
temporary biology provides many examples of how to avoid
the fallacy that every aspect of every trait is an adaptation (the
‘‘Panglossian Paradigm’’). Furthermore, the emerging plu-
ralistic explanatory paradigms of evo-devo allow us to clarify
the notion of evolutionary constraints in genetic and devel-
opmental terms, and thus to more clearly understand the way
selection and constraints interact in evolution. Although the
application of this more synthetic, pluralistic and compara-
tive approach to human cognitive evolution remains in its
infancy, cognitive biologists can learn from exemplary
models in functional morphology and the study of the ver-
tebrate brain. The result will be a richer, more biological
perspective on cognitive evolution. This viewpoint
acknowledges the central importance of natural selection, but
treats adaptation, in any particular case, as a hypothesis to be
tested rather than assumed. Furthermore, this approach inte-
grates the rapidly-developing understanding of constraints on
brain development, and highly conservative genetic and
developmental mechanisms, as an important component of
evolutionary understanding. My goal here is to show how a
balanced pluralistic cognitive biology along these lines is
both necessary and desirable (cf. Dor and Jablonka 2010).
Understanding Constraints: Is the Giraffe’s Neck
an Adaptation?
A slightly more difficult situation arises when we attempt
to interpret non-adaptive details of an organ which, on the
whole, seems adaptive. For example, the long neck of the
giraffe has for centuries been considered an adaptation for
browsing on high foliage. But giraffes have the same seven
cervical vertebrae as other mammals (ignoring definitional
sophistry like that of (Solounias 1999)). Indeed, with a very
few exceptions, every mammal species (from the neckless
whales to the long-necked giraffes or camels) has exactly
seven cervical vertebrae (Fig. 1). It would thus be fatuous
to attempt to understand the number of bones in a human
(or giraffe or whale) neck as an adaptation to bipedalism,
browsing, or aquatic lifestyle, and this trait thus provides a
nice model system to explore constraints and adaptation in
the concrete domain of animal form.
In contrast to mammals, many other vertebrates, like
birds or reptiles, have different numbers of cervical ver-
tebrae in long-necked versus short-necked forms (13–25 in
birds, p 79: Starck 1979). From an engineering point of
view, the option of adding vertebrae during the evolution
A
B
Fig. 1 Schematic views of the skeleton of a giraffe and a narwhal,
with insets showing that this supremely long-necked species and this
virtually neckless cetacean each have seven cervical vertebrae. This is
a pan-mammalian constraint, but does not hold in other vertebrates,
who may have widely varying numbers of neck vertebrae. Thus,
‘‘seven cervical vertebrae’’ is a nice example of a constraint operating
during the evolution of necks in mammals, including humans a
Giraffe Giraffa camelopardalis, b Narwhal Monodon monoceros
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of long necks is a good strategy: simply repeat a modular
structure, adding or subtracting vertebrae until you’ve got
an optimal neck length. Indeed, long necks also evolved in
some Mesozoic aquatic reptiles like plesiosaurs and
elasmosaurs via simple, gradual addition of neck vertebrae
(Narita and Kuratani 2005). Thus there is no ‘‘in princi-
ple’’ restriction to seven cervical vertebrae among verte-
brates as a whole: this is a mammal-specific constraint.
This example provides one well-researched example of a
developmental constraint interacting with natural selection
to produce an end-result with details that are not them-
selves adaptations (cf. Galis 1999; Narita and Kuratani
2005). It is imprecise to say that the neck of a giraffe is an
adaptation to browsing high leaves—we should rather say
that giraffe neck length is such an adaptation. Other
aspects of neck anatomy, such as the number of vertebrae,
or the tortuous course of the laryngeal nerve, result from
developmental constraints and have not themselves been
optimized by natural selection during the evolution of a
long neck. Indeed, these constraints appear to have been
established long previously, in the first mammals, for they
are respected by both monotremes and marsupials, along
with virtually all placental mammals (the only exceptions
are some sloths, and manatees, Young 1981).
A similar constraint-based logic applies to the human
hand: our five fingers may be well-suited to tool manipu-
lation, but they are not adaptations for this task. The five-
finger default evolved in basal tetrapods long before
humans or primates existed (cf. Coates and Clack 1990;
Shubin et al. 1997). Any attempt to explain our five fingers
as optimal for tool use would be to court the ‘‘Panglossian’’
caricature introduced by (Gould and Lewontin 1979),
where the bridges of our noses are seen as adaptations for
supporting bifocals. While this seems obvious in these
morphological examples, we will see below that the issues
are considerably murkier when we come to constraints on
neural and cognitive mechanisms, where ancient, phylo-
genetic constraints play central roles in explaining the final
structure and circuitry of the adult brain.
Where Do Constraints Come From?
There is a long history of discussion of constraints on form,
starting with William Bateson’s monumental ‘‘Materials
for the study of variation’’ (Bateson 1894), and a resulting
plethora of terminology for categorizing different types of
constraints. I will not attempt to review this literature here.
Rather I will provide two exemplary sources of con-
straints—genetic and developmental—that I think provide
a reasonable and uncontroversial starting point for the
assimilation of constraint-based thinking to current think-
ing in cognitive evolution.
The Genetic Inevitability of Correlated Traits:
Pleiotropy and Linkage
Among molecular biologists, genetic drift (the random
fluctuation of alleles, particularly important in small, iso-
lated populations) has long been recognized as counter-
force to adaptation. Two further well-understood genetic
mechanisms underscore the ubiquity of constraints on
adaptation. Both result from textbook facts about genetics,
and stem from the nature of genes, and their layout (in
eukaryotes) on different chromosomes. First, many, prob-
ably most, genes play multiple roles in the development of
unrelated structures. This multi-functionality is termed
‘‘pleiotropy’’ (classic examples are the cystic fibrosis or
phenylketonuria alleles in humans). Because of pleiotropy,
a new allele arising by mutation will have multiple effects
on the organism’s final adult phenotype. If that mutation is,
on average, favored in the current environment, natural
selection can favor the new allele. Far more commonly, of
course, the new allele is dysfunctional on average, and
rapidly disappears. Since survival and reproduction is a
function of the entire, integrated phenotype of our new
mutant, its survival advantage accrues to all of the phe-
notypic effects of the new allele, not just the one or two
that may seem obviously relevant to survival. While a new
allele of an enzyme may have beneficial effects on diges-
tion, it may have other effects on metabolism, coloration,
or other seemingly unrelated factors. Even if these other
effects of the gene are, on average, mal-adaptive, the new
allele may nonetheless increase in the population, if its
positive effect on digestion is strong enough to compen-
sate. As a result, it is often said that selection is ‘‘blind’’ to
which phenotypic effects are positive and which are neg-
ative. Later, of course, further evolution can occur which
may moderate or suppress such maladaptive side-effects,
but the initial rise of the gene frequency will carry them
along inevitably.
A second source of ‘‘correlated traits’’ is genetic hitch-
hiking, (Maynard Smith and Haigh 1974; Hoekstra and
Coyne 2007; Williamson et al. 2007; Rubin et al. 2010).
Genes are physically located on chromosomes, and the
processing of ‘‘shuffling’’ different alleles from one strand
to the other is slow, occurring over many generations.
Thus, when any particular gene variant is subjected to
selection, neighboring regions on the chromosome are also
selected in an event termed a ‘‘selective sweep’’. In the
case of powerful selection this neighboring region may be
very large, and contain many other alleles that share no
functional role with the ‘‘target’’ allele. Such ‘‘hitch-hiker’’
alleles are also selected during a sweep. Later evolution
will eventually ‘‘break up’’ these hitchhiking traits from the
target trait, but in the meantime considerable allelic vari-
ation may have been eliminated from the population,
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including potentially positive alleles whose importance
was outweighed by the target of selection. Because some of
the hitchhiking alleles will be present due to genetic drift,
particularly in small or isolated populations, the selective
sweep ‘‘amplifies’’ the genetic noise that is due to pure
chance. Hitchhiking provides another form of correlated
variation, distinct from pleiotropy, because hitchhiking
effects are due to multiple independent genes, rather than
multiple effects of a single gene.
I provide these examples to show how we can under-
stand constraints on evolution in terms of perfectly
uncontroversial molecular mechanisms. However, both are
relatively weak in the sense that there exist compensatory
mechanisms (additional layers of control in the case of
pleiotropy, and recombination in the case of hitchhiking)
that can overcome them, often in the space of a few hun-
dred generations. Most advocates of the importance of
constraints in evolution have focused on a deeper set of
constraints, some of which can persist for many millions
of years.
A Menagerie of Constraints
The existence of a more fundamental class of evolutionary
constraints on adaptation has long been recognized.
Darwin’s colleague and ‘‘bulldog’’ T. H. Huxley
acknowledged their importance explicitly (cf. Maynard
Smith et al. 1985). Despite this long recognition, they have
often seemed a hodge-podge assortment of relatively
peripheral phenomena, and various terms have been
offered to classify them, including ‘‘constraints of growth’’
(e.g. allometry), ‘‘developmental constraints’’ (e.g. pleiot-
ropy and multiplicity of phenotypic effects), and ‘‘phylo-
genetic constraints’’ or ‘‘phylogenetic inertia’’ (results of a
clade’s ‘‘Bauplan’’, like the mammal’s seven cervical
vertebrae). Most biologists today take it for granted that the
complexities of development and the vagaries of phylo-
genetic history tightly constrain many adaptive processes.
Note that the term ‘‘constraint’’ is a bit misleading, because
historical and developmental forces don’t simply limit
adaptation, they also bias and channel the generation of
phenotypic variation: they provide the scaffolding upon
which natural selection acts (cf. Kirschner and Gerhart
1998, 2005).
Developmental constraints have been defined by
Maynard-Smith and colleagues as ‘‘biases on the produc-
tion of variant phenotypes, or limitations on phenotypic
variability, caused by the structure, character, composition,
or dynamics of the developmental system’’ (p. 265, May-
nard Smith et al. 1985). In general, fundamental genetic
bases of development are extremely conserved, and in
many cases shared by all living metazoans. Thus evo-devo
embraces genetic and phylogenetic constraints under one
broad umbrella: the conservation of developmental mech-
anisms (Gilbert et al. 1996; Kirschner and Gerhart 2005;
Carroll 2008). Because they are ubiquitous, developmental
constraints probably play the most important role in the
overall effect of constraint on the evolution of complex
traits. For any organ, we expect certain details of form and
physiology to represent adaptations, while others reflect
phylogenetically conservative developmental constraints of
various sorts, or spandrels (Gould and Lewontin 1979).
Influenced by evo-devo, recent overviews of human anat-
omy have emphasized such historical constraints on human
biology (Shubin 2008; Held 2009).
Gould, a champion of the importance of constraints in
evolution throughout his career, offered two other exam-
ples of constraints. First, ‘‘constraints of growth’’ are
effects on details of the overall phenotype caused by
selection for specific traits (Gould 1977); when the selec-
tion is on body size, the changes in shape that co-occur are
studied under the rubric allometry. There is a long history
of allometric study (Huxley 1932; Thompson 1948; Gould
1966; Finlay et al. 2001), but its developmental basis
remains unclear. Second, a trait that arises as a spandrel
may be later, opportunistically, be put to use, and Gould
argued that such exaptations are particularly relevant to
cognitive evolution (Gould 1991).
A Constraint Explained by Evo-Devo
To illustrate, let us return to the giraffe’s neck. The last
decades have brought important breakthroughs in our
understanding of the developmental system patterning the
spinal column in mammals and other vertebrates, allowing
us to clarify traditional notions like ‘‘Bauplan’’ in mecha-
nistic, developmental terms. Briefly, vertebrae are formed
in the embryo from somitomeres, which are repeated
structures running down the embryo’s back. The process of
somitomere formation—somitogenesis—involves oscilla-
tory changes in gene expression as the embryo grows
(Pourquie´ 2003; Lewis 2008). During development, an
oscillatory process in time (the ‘‘segmentation clock’’) is
converted to a repeated pattern of vertebrae in space (the
future spinal column). This system is reminiscent of tra-
ditional models in mathematical biology (e.g., Turing
1952; Wolpert 1969), first proposed as a concrete hypoth-
esis much later, by Lewis (1978). Today, we know that
many genes, engaged in interacting oscillatory ‘‘circuits’’,
are involved in somitogenesis (Aulehla and Pourquie´ 2008;
Gomez et al. 2008). This is thus an excellent arena to ask
how new findings in genetics and development can illu-
minate old ideas about the mathematics of pattern forma-
tion, and even older ideas about the vertebrate Bauplan and
the role of constraints in evolution.
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A core principle of evo-devo is that, although pheno-
types may vary widely among living organisms, the
underlying developmental processes are often the same,
even to the point of utilizing identical genes in analogous
ways (Gilbert 2003; Carroll 2008). The genetic and
developmental toolkit remains constant even when the
output of the developmental ‘‘workshop’’ varies consider-
ably between species. Thus, the process of somitogenesis is
shared among all vertebrates, and indeed many of the
underlying genetic mechanisms are also used to build the
body segments of insects and other arthopods. This is an
example of ‘‘deep homology’’, the surprising finding of
identical genetic mechanisms underlying similar traits in
widely-divergent taxa like giraffes, frogs and fruit flies
(Shubin et al. 1997; Carroll 2008; Shubin et al. 2009). It
also is an example of a deep developmental constraint on
evolution: despite some flexibility of somitogenesis across
taxa, tampering with this system can lead to major, and
typically fatal, changes in any particular embryo.
Thus, giraffes and other mammals have seven neck
vertebrae because the entire spine is patterned by an
ancient developmental system, and changing this system
has implications for many aspects of morphology (not just
neck length). A mutation which changes the timing of
somitogenic gene expression, or the interactions between
genes in the segmentation clock, can have multiple, often
drastic effects (Ishimatsu et al. 2010). These linked chan-
ges often lead to a failure during development. Embryonic
death represents a form of ‘‘internal selection’’ during
development (Whyte 1965; Raff 1996). Although it
remains unclear why mammals are more constrained by
this system than other vertebrates, considering the apparent
exceptions to the rule provides some clues. The only
mammalian exceptions to the ‘‘rule of seven’’ are sloths
(with six to ten neck vertebrae) and manatees (with six)
(see Fig. 2). However, it now appears that the ‘‘extra’’
cervical vertebrae in Bradypus sloths are simply thoracic
vertebrae that have lost their ribs (Bell 1834; Hautier et al.
2010), and actually are an exception that proves the rule.
The situation in manatees and short-necked Choloepus
sloths is less clear, but in both cases the cervical changes
seems to reflect more global changes in overall spinal
patterning, so that the change in cervical count is a
by-product of some overall adaptive change (Buchholtz
et al. 2007; Buchholtz and Stepien 2009). These aspects of
mammalian spinal patterning may be more ‘‘locked in’’ by
a system of mutually-constraining, coupled gene circuits
and/or developmental mechanisms, than in other verte-
brates like birds (Galis 1999). This hypothesis is supported
by the finding that changes in neck vertebra count can be
found in humans, and are indeed relatively common: but
only in spontaneously aborted embryos, or dead infants
(Galis et al. 2006). This is a perfect, if chilling, illustration
of the importance of ‘‘internal selection’’ in development,
and its role in the evolution of the human body.
Developmental constraints thus have profound effects
on morphology, and can be specified in mechanistic terms
in a way relevant to understanding the evolution of form
and function. The new perspective of evo-devo allows us to
clarify one of Darwin’s central themes—descent with
modification—in modern terms. We can thus better
understand many aspects of the phenotype as resulting
from phylogenetic and developmental constraints, which
ultimately result from historical factors, not adaptation. But
this perspective also dispenses with any appearance of
conflict between adaptation and constraint: both are central
components of any full explanation of a trait. Constraints
provide the context in which adaptation occurs, by filtering
many non-functional phenotypes long before they are born
and exposed to environmental selection.
Distinguishing Adaptive Traits from Non-adaptive
Byproducts of Constraints
The existence of correlated traits, whether stemming from
developmental or genetic constraints, leads to a quandary.
Biologists are interested not only in the history of a trait,
A
B
Fig. 2 Mammalian Exceptions: The only mammals to have fewer or
more cervical vertebrae than the seven typifying all other mammals
are manatees (genus Trichecus) and sloths (genera Bradypus and
Choloepus). Long necked sloths are actually ‘‘exceptions that prove
the rule’’: what appear to be extra cervical vertebrae are actually just
thoracic vertebrae that have lost their ribs. The situation in manatees
and short-necked sloths remains a topic of current investigation. a
Sloth Bradypus tridactylus, b Manatee Trichecus manatus
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but also in the causal forces which lie behind this history.
As already shown, we need to accept the existence of
correlated traits which do not, in any direct way, have a
current causal role in increasing survival and reproduction.
Thus, we need some way of distinguishing a ‘‘target’’ trait
of natural selection, the variant that leads to increased
survival/reproduction, from the various correlated traits
that typically come along for the ride. This is a core
problem that the existence of constraints and correlated
traits forces us to confront. It is particularly important
when we consider the details of cognitive traits, where the
fine-tuning of neural circuits during development may
incorporate underlying constraints into the final circuit. The
robustness of development leads to circuitry which is
functional and seems adaptive, but which is not in fact an
adaptation in the strict sense of (Williams 1966a).
Distinguishing correlated traits from those specifically
selected is not a trivial problem, in two distinct senses.
First, it has no general solution: we need to solve it on a
case-by-case basis, depending on the trait, its genetic basis,
the phylogeny of the species, and the relevant ecological
and selective circumstances. Thus, at a minimum, we need
to know a lot about an organisms’ physiology, phylogeny
and ecology before we can even hope to distinguish tar-
geted from correlated traits.
Second, if we were to fail, in general, to distinguish
them, the explanatory power of the theory of natural
selection is called into question. In particular, if we are to
save evolutionary theory from being tautological (‘‘selec-
tion is survival of the fittest, and the fittest are defined as
those who survive’’), we need some independent way of
distinguishing the trait(s) ‘‘selected-for’’ versus those that
are merely ‘‘selected’’. This quandary has received sur-
prisingly little attention from philosophers of biology
(though see Sober 1993; Gould 2002), but has recently
been brought to a head by critics of evolutionary psy-
chology (e.g., Buller 2005). In particular, a recent sweeping
attack on the entire theory of natural selection is based on
precisely this problem (Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini 2010).
Fortunately, although the problem is real, we need not
accept the policy of despair offered by these authors,
because practicing biologists have had a working solution
for many years.
The theory of natural selection holds that animals vary,
that offspring resemble their parents, and that not all
organisms survive and reproduce equally. If any inheritable
variation is causally related to survival, those with the
advantageous variation will, on average, survive longer,
reproduce more, and increase in the population. This much
is clear and true, and is clearly not tautological. The
problems arise when we attempt to anatomize the suc-
cessful variants produced by natural selection, singling out
some anatomical, physiological or behavioral trait as ‘‘an
adaptation’’. Given the ubiquity of correlated variation, we
want some non-arbitrary way of determining which aspects
of the variant trait are, and which aren’t, causally related to
increased survival and reproduction. Neither Darwin’s
theory, nor modern neo-Darwinism, offers any automatic
algorithm or simple definitional criteria for distinguishing
such adaptations from mere correlated traits. Nonetheless
contemporary biology provides many clear examples of
how to make the distinction, via a process of hypothesis-
testing, contingent upon the trait and species in question.
This scientific discrimination process is intrinsically post
hoc in the usual (and not pejorative) sense that all discus-
sions of biological history must be: we have data about the
current situation (and, if we are lucky, a fossil or two) and
we attempt to use these data to understand past historical
processes that led to the current situation.
There are two prime tools at our disposal. The first is
comparative, and involves the reconstruction of phyloge-
netic history based on existing species. We first examine the
trait in question in many related species. If we find homol-
ogies in related forms, we use them to deduce the evolu-
tionary time period during which the variant evolved.
Applying this technique to the giraffe’s neck, we find that the
giraffe’s closest living relative, the okapi, has a somewhat
elongated but relatively normal neck, as do most of giraffe’s
more distant relatives among hoofed mammals. Even with-
out examining the fossil record, we can clearly state that an
unusually long neck is a derived trait of giraffes. In sharp
contrast, counting neck vertebrae, or many other anatomical
and physiological features of the giraffe’s neck, we find
characters that are widely shared not only with okapis but
with virtually all mammals. None of those are good candi-
dates for ‘‘giraffe-specific adaptations’’. Indeed, if they vary
so little in the large clade of all mammals, they are excellent
candidates for constraints on adaptation.
The comparative approach does not stop there. Crucially,
if comparative research uncovers examples of convergent
evolution, we can use them to test evolutionary hypotheses
and derive other conclusions. Convergence may help us
discern the function of the trait more clearly, by observing
similarities and differences in species behavior or ecology.
Convergence may also help us to distinguish between the
adaptive and non-adaptive components of the trait (e.g.
isolating the lens and iris as presumably adaptive compo-
nents of vertebrate and cephalopod eyes, and the inverted
vertebrate retina as presumably non-adaptive: Walls 1942;
Allman 1999). Finally, if a well-defined trait has evolved
convergently often enough, we can use such examples as
independent data points to empirically test our hypotheses
about function. This final point makes analysis of conver-
gence a core component of the modern comparative method,
using independent contrasts (cf. Harvey and Pagel 1991).
Thus a broad comparative and phylogenetic approach is one
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source of evidence bearing upon both specific adaptations,
and constraints upon them.
The second tool involves adopting an engineering per-
spective, in which we detail the (hypothetical) adaptive
problem or problems ‘‘solved’’ by some characteristic, and
then use principles of physics and physiology to make
predictions about how the trait should vary. Such an
engineering approach is what allows biologists to evade the
charge of circularity in definitions of fitness and adaptation.
The fittest are not simply those who survived, but rather
those whose survival was causally linked to their posses-
sion of some trait, and where specific components of that
trait can be causally linked to the solution of some problem
habitually faced by the species in question. Depending on
whether the problem in question is digesting some novel
sugar, efficiently finding food, running faster than preda-
tors, or simply hiding from them via camouflage, we expect
quite different engineering principles and constraints to be
relevant.
This approach is termed ‘‘reverse engineering’’, some-
times disparagingly (e.g. Buller 2005), but involves noth-
ing more than scientists tackling a difficult problem by
using all of the information available. The methods adop-
ted are often those of engineering design, including espe-
cially abstraction/idealization of the problem, and then use
of optimization theory to find the best solution given var-
ious specific constraints (Maynard Smith 1978a). Different
hypotheses about the adaptation invoke different princi-
ples, and imply different optimal solutions. If wing feathers
are an adaptation for heat retention and thermal insulation,
we expect certain characteristics. If they are adapted to
powered flight, we predict others. Having made such pre-
dictions, we return to our feather collection and examine,
or test them for the predicted characteristics (cf. Gould and
Vrba 1982). In this case, we find that wing feathers in
living birds bear traits (e.g. asymmetry) that are explicable
based on optimization for powered flight, but not as insu-
lation. The same examination leads to the opposite con-
clusion for nestling feathers or for adult down, which in
fact are optimized for heat retention.
In principle, the combination of comparative and engi-
neering approaches allow us, through a process of empir-
ical hypothesis testing, to tease out what aspects of a trait
are adaptive, and what problem(s) they are adaptations
‘‘for’’. This two-pronged approach provides a ready answer
to the criticism of tautology (Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini
2010): we use extra-evolutionary principles to cash out our
predictions about the function of and selective forces that
acted on the trait of interest. Both aspects of this approach
were familiar to Darwin, and both are ubiquitous in modern
biology. While Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini are correct
that neither Darwin nor modern evolutionary theory pro-
vide us with any sweeping ‘‘laws of selection’’ of uniform
applicability to all traits and all species, this is hardly a
worrying criticism. It is like criticizing Newton’s laws for
not providing all relevant details of contemporary fluid
dynamics needed to build efficient submarines and air-
planes. No general theory can specify all such particulars.
Indeed, the invocation of particular, problem-specific
engineering principles of physics and physiology is pre-
cisely what allows evolutionary theory to escape the charge
of tautology. Although Dobzhansky was right that nothing
in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution
(Dobzhansky 1973), it is equally true that nothing in evo-
lution makes sense except in the light of biology more
generally (including its mechanistic grounding in the other
natural sciences).
Unfortunately, the degree to which we understand the
relevant physics and physiology varies considerably from
trait to trait. Physicists and engineers know a lot about
aerodynamics, and thus can say a lot about the functional
morphology of bird, bat and insect flight (Dickinson et al.
2000) or the mechanics of chewing, digging, or vocaliza-
tion (Hiiema¨e and Ardran 1968; Biewener et al. 1985;
Alexander 1992; Pough et al. 1996; Fitch and Hauser
2002). The clearest examples thus come from these
domains of ‘‘functional morphology’’. When we turn to
cognition and neural computation, the relevant engineering
principles are much less clear, posing major unsolved
problems for those interested in the evolution of behavior
and cognition.
Part Two: Distinguishing Constraint From Adaptation
in Human Evolution
This discussion leads me to the following proposal: con-
straint-based thinking in models of language evolution
requires recognition that many aspects of modern human
language do not, in any meaningful sense, constitute
adaptations. Rather, they reflect deep developmental and
phylogenetic constraints on the physiological and neural
mechanisms underlying linguistic behaviour. Furthermore,
the multiple functions that language performs in modern
humans make it a challenge to highlight any one of them,
such as communication or thought, as ‘‘the’’ central
adaptive function of language, at present or in the evolu-
tionary past. Finally, the fact that languages are learned—a
form of phenotypic plasticity—complicates the explana-
tory situation considerably. When we find some apparently
optimal situation in adult language, it is always possible
that this optimality results from fine-tuning during ontog-
eny, rather than adaptation during phylogeny. A reverse
engineering approach will thus have only limited success
until it is paired with a deeper understanding of the con-
straints on cognitive and neural evolution, and on neural
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plasticity. Because this argument remains controversial,
and even inflammatory in certain circles (cf. Fodor and
Piatelli-Palmarini 2010; Botha 2011), I will support my
contention using two examples: the evolution of bipedal-
ism, and the evolution of the human vocal tract.
Constraints, Adaptation and the Evolution
of Bipedalism
Bipedalism refers to terrestrial locomotion on two legs
(running, walking, hopping, etc.). Much is known about
how human walking and running work mechanistically. A
good hominin fossil record of hips and hindlimbs, and
hominid footprints at Laetoli (Leakey and Hay 1979),
makes bipedalism one of the best understood aspects of
recent human evolution. Despite this knowledge, the
adaptive function of human bipedalism remains obscure,
and functional morphologists often dismiss discussions of
the adaptive origins of bipedalism as speculative story-
telling (e.g.,Hutchinson and Gatesy 2001).
Unlike language, bipedalism has evolved repeatedly
among other animals. The mechanics of walking and run-
ning have been well studied in both humans and birds, and
rest upon similar mechanical principles, allowing ‘‘reverse
engineering’’ (Dickinson et al. 2000). Birds provide the
most numerous and obvious example, but apes and mon-
keys can walk bipedally for short periods, and various liz-
ards or insects sometimes run bipedally. Although unique in
some details (Alexander 2004), many details connected
with human bipedalism are also observed in such species
(cf. Gatesy and Biewener 1991; Hirasaki et al. 2004). These
multiple convergent exemplars of bipedal locomotion help
us test hypotheses concerning the evolution of human
bipedalism. For example, a key convergent parallel is the
bringing of the feet into line nearly directly beneath the
midline. When lost, as in short-legged penguins (Griffin and
Kram 2000), the result is a shuffling inefficient walk. This
change from the ancestral ‘‘sprawling,’’ vertebrate gait is
one key to greater bipedal efficiency. Such comparative
data also illustrate the requirement for specific anatomical
changes to support efficient walking.
Turning to the adaptive function of walking, we find an
obscure situation. Numerous hypotheses (at least 30) have
been offered concerning why humans became bipedal in
the first place (reviewed in Niemitz 2010). The old idea
that bipedalism was a reaction to tool use, to allow more
efficient carrying, is disproved by the fact that sophisticated
stone tools followed bipedalism in the fossil record by
several million years. The current ‘‘standard’’ hypothesis is
that the energetic advantages of bipedal walking drove its
evolution. Other widely-discussed possibilities include a
decrease in the surface area of the body exposed to solar
radiation, raising the head above grass and obstacles for a
better view, more impressive displays during conflicts, or
adaptation to aquatic foraging. That bipedalism is benefi-
cial in these ways seems clear, but proposals that biped-
alism is a biological adaptation to any one (or several) of
them have proved very controversial indeed.
Furthermore, the energetics of human walking and
running differ considerably (Taylor et al. 1970; Taylor and
Rowntree 1973; Rodman and McHenry 1980): bipedal
walking is slightly more efficient, and running considerably
less efficient, energetically speaking, than the correspond-
ing quadrupedal gaits. The efficiency of human walking
rests on an ‘‘inverted pendulum’’ mechanism: in mid-stride,
the center of gravity is at its highest point, and stores
energy that is released during falling toward the end of the
stride. Adaptive explanation for bipedalism must explain
not only the value of walking, but also why the costs of
bipedal running did not outweigh those advantages. One
possibility is that human endurance running is unusually
flexible in tempo, due to a breaking of constraint tying
respiration to footfalls. In Homo, this flexibility might have
proved advantageous in sustained chasing of game, despite
increased energetic costs (Bramble and Lieberman 2004).
Clearly, even for this relatively simple and mechanisti-
cally well-understood change in human form, with a good
fossil record, the question of adaptive function is fraught
with ambiguity and controversy. One potential solution is
to be more specific about what, precisely, we aim to
explain with particular adaptive hypotheses and admit that
‘‘Bipedalism’’ as a monolithic entity is too broad to allow a
single, simple causal explanation. Bipedal walking and
bipedal running may have different historical origins and
functional causes, separated by long time periods. For
example, human legs have long, spring-like Achilles ten-
dons which store and release energy during running. These
are absent in apes, and serve little purpose during the
‘‘inverted pendulum’’ of human walking. It is thus sensible
to ask whether compliant Achilles tendons, or similar
details like toe shortening, are an adaptation to running
(Bramble and Lieberman 2004). At even a finer level, we
can ask whether breathing through the mouth (typical in
human runners) versus the nose (habitual in apes), which
Bramble and Lieberman offer as a potential ‘‘key innova-
tion’’ during human evolution, is an adaptation to endur-
ance running.
Let us turn now to constraints. One problem in consid-
ering bipedalism from an adaptive viewpoint is that many
historical, developmental constraints clearly influence the
evolution of body form and thus constrain locomotory
evolution (Maynard Smith 1978b). Bipedalism evolved
within a context of morphological constraints like the
number of leg bones and physiological constraints of bone
strength, muscle properties, the rhythm of breathing, and
neural control of balance that long predated bipedalism.
624 Evol Biol (2012) 39:613–637
123
Such details are central to understanding adaptive function
in locomotion in any species, and an optimization analysis
starts with an understanding them, and how they restrict the
range of developmental possibilities (Maynard Smith
1978a).
To be ‘‘possible’’ a variant must be able to survive
developmentally (unlike, for example, modifications in
neck vertebrae number (Galis et al. 2006)) and also survive
tradeoffs caused by use for multiple purposes (e.g. between
efficient walking versus running). There can be little doubt
that many of the medical difficulties that human suffer (bad
knees, back problems, hip replacements, problematic
childbirth…) are the direct result of the novel and recent
exaptation for bipedalism of an ancestral limb structure
adapted to quadrupedalism (Held 2009).
Finally, not all aspects of morphology that are ‘‘adap-
tive’’ in the ordinary sense of working efficiently are
‘‘adaptations’’ in the evolutionary sense. Considerable
research on bipedalism in normally quadrupedal mammals,
including monkeys, rats and goats, shows that animals
forced to locomote on their hind legs can do so. When
bipedalism is enforced, from a young age, multiple aspects
of skeletal anatomy in the skull, spine and pelvis, change
developmentally to resemble the anatomy of humans (e.g. a
curved spine or splayed pelvis) (Slijper 1942; Moss 1961;
Kay and Condon 1987; Hayama et al. 1992; Nakatsukasa
et al. 1995). Without a solid understanding of such
phenotypic plasticity, it is quite difficult to separate
mutation-driven, inheritable changes which might consti-
tute adaptations from ontogenetic accommodation to
bipedal behaviour in our ancestors.
To summarize, human bipedalism is well-studied and in
many ways well-understood. But despite these virtues,
questions regarding the adaptive function(s) of bipedalism
are mired in controversy. This offers a clear lesson
regarding language evolution, since we are far more for-
tunate regarding human bipedalism than for human lan-
guage. Bipedalism illustrates the need to focus on
mechanisms and developmental constraints and to sharpen
our questions about what details we hope to explain as
adaptations, if we are to have any hope whatsoever of
understanding the phylogenetic history and adaptive func-
tions of human language.
The Evolution of Speech: Human Vocal Tract Anatomy
and Vocal Imitation
A second example of the interaction between adaptation,
exaptation and constraints is provided by the evolution of
human vocal tract anatomy in humans (cf. Fitch 2000,
2010). Adult humans have a low-lying larynx compared
to most other mammals: the larynx and hyoid bone
(which anchors the tongue base) are retracted caudally
(downwards). As already noted by Darwin, this lowered
larynx appears to increase our risk of choking (Darwin
1859). For decades this bizarre conformation was believed
to be uniquely human, and an obvious adaptation to
speech, because the associated change in tongue shape
allows humans to make vocal tract shapes thought
impossible with a ‘‘normal’’ high larynx (Lieberman and
Crelin 1971; Lieberman 1984). The status of the des-
cended larynx as an adaptation for speech went unques-
tioned for many years (Lieberman 1975, 1984; Pinker and
Bloom 1990; Lieberman 2000; Pinker and Jackendoff
2005).
In 2001 my colleague David Reby and I were surprised
to discover that some deer species have permanently des-
cended larynges (Fitch and Reby 2001). Since then, a
similar, permanently-retracted larynx has been found in
other mammals, including several gazelles and all of the
big cats (Weissengruber et al. 2002; Frey and Riede 2003).
Since none of these nonhuman species produce speechlike
vocalizations, these findings raised an obvious question:
what non-speech function might a descended larynx serve?
Fortunately, earlier work had already clarified a plausible
alternative hypothesis: that a retracted larynx serves to
elongate the vocal tract, leading to lowered formant fre-
quencies that convey an acoustic impression of increased
size (Fitch 1994, 1997). The simple but very impressive
roars of these nonhuman species was consistent with this
‘‘size exaggeration’’ hypothesis. Considerable further work
has confirmed key components of this proposal: formants
often correlate with body size (e.g., Fitch 1997; Reby and
McComb 2003; Riede and Titze 2008), and humans, dogs,
and deer use this information when judging body size
(Smith et al. 2005; Charlton et al. 2008; Taylor et al. 2011).
Furthermore, a secondary descent of the larynx occurs in
humans at puberty (Fitch and Giedd 1999; Lieberman et al.
2001), but only in males. This second descent lowers for-
mants without increasing speech abilities, allowing the size
exaggeration hypothesis to also account for this previously
unexplained aspect of human vocal tract anatomy (Fitch
2002).
With these new findings in hand, we may ask whether
human vocal anatomy is an adaptation for language, spe-
cifically for vowel production. Certainly, we humans use
our reconfigured vocal apparatus to produce distinctive
vowels, and the world’s languages have developed vowel
systems exploit this capability (Liljencrants and Lindblom
1972; de Boer 2001; Oudeyer 2005). But usefulness does
not demonstrate adaptation for speech, and even today, the
‘‘extra’’ laryngeal descent that occurs during puberty in
males alone does not appear helpful for speech, and in
general women’s speech abilities are superior to men’s
(Maccoby and Jacklin 1974; Henton 1992). Male-specific
pubertal descent thus seems unlikely to be an adaptation for
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speech, and more likely, is an adaptation for size exag-
geration, just as in deer or lions (Fitch 2002).
An additional argument has occasionally been made,
that the human larynx descends for purely mechanical
reasons due to the assumption of upright posture and a
change in skull conformation. By this argument, the des-
cended larynx would be a spandrel—a necessary byproduct
of other, adaptive changes—and the undoubted usefulness
of this trait for speech is just like the usefulness for the
bridge of our nose for supporting sunglasses.
A second possibility is that the descended larynx ini-
tially evolved as an adaptation for size exaggeration, was
later exapted for phonetic use, and that subsequent evolu-
tion has converted it to a true adaptation for spoken
language. By this argument, the descent of the larynx
which occurs during infancy in both sexes can plausibly be
hypothesized to be an adaptation for the production of
vowels, as originally hypothesized by Lieberman and col-
leagues, while pubertal adult male descent remains an
adaptation for body size exaggeration. Currently, no one
has done more than make a plausible case (e.g., Lieberman
1984) that this anatomical change improves communica-
tion, and thus increased the survival and reproduction of
ancestral males who possessed it.
Turning briefly to a different aspect of the evolution of
human speech, our capacity for vocal imitation of complex
sounds is unique among primates, but shared with other
vertebrates including many birds (Nottebohm 1975; 1976;
Marler 2000) and some mammals (Janik and Slater 1997;
Fitch 2000). Vocal imitation results from changes in neural
control, not vocal anatomy, as illustrated by talking seals
which have a high resting larynx position but, due to their
neural capacity for vocal learning, can imitate speech
(Ralls et al. 1985; Deacon 1997). Much has been learned
about vocal imitation in recent years, and its convergent
evolution in other species provides an excellent opportu-
nity to test ideas about its development and evolution in
humans (cf. Doupe and Kuhl 1999; Jarvis 2007; Matsunaga
and Okanoya 2009; Fitch 2011a). Is vocal imitation an
‘‘adaptation for speech’’?
Vocal imitation is key to both speech and song in
humans, and is shared with other species who use it in
vocalizations termed ‘‘song’’. One hypothesis about the
evolution of speech posits an intermediate state, a ‘‘musical
protolanguage’’ more like modern song than speech (Dar-
win 1871; Mithen 2005; Fitch 2006). Darwin cited vocal
imitation in birds as clear evidence that selection for song
can drive the evolution of vocal imitation, and more recent
discoveries strengthen that argument: virtually all non-
human vocal imitators use the skill in songlike behaviour,
and none produce anything resembling speech or spoken
language. Accepting the basic plausibility of this hypoth-
esis, questions about whether vocal imitation first evolved
for song-like purposes or speech-like purposes will remain
difficult to resolve. Was song the original function of vocal
imitation (Darwin 1871), with speech an exapted byprod-
uct? Or is song simply a spandrel of speech, of no adaptive
value (Pinker 1997)? Again, despite significant advances in
understanding the mechanistic basis of speech, this his-
torical adaptive question will remain challenging. In con-
clusion no confident assertions about the adaptive value,
for speech, of a descended larynx or vocal imitation in
humans (e.g., Lieberman 1984; Pinker and Jackendoff
2005; Lieberman 2007) can be justified by currently
available data.
Part Three: Adaptation and Constraint in Human
Cognitive Evolution
So far, I showed that phylogenetic and developmental
constraints are ubiquitous and inevitable, and I argued that
constraints must play a central role in explaining and
interpreting organismic form and function. I described how
we can distinguish the properties of an organism that result
from historical constraints (e.g. pleiotropy, allometry,
unmodified ‘‘spandrels’’) versus those that constitute
adaptations, by using a reverse engineering approach and
comparative tests on convergently-evolved traits in multi-
ple clades. Though this empirical distinction is both nec-
essary in principle, and occasionally accomplished in
practice, it requires laborious, time-consuming scientific
work. As a result, even in well-researched examples like
bipedalism and speech, many core questions about adaptive
function remain completely unresolved, and are likely to
remain so. Adaptive hypotheses may serve as useful
‘‘intuition pumps’’ to drive empirical research, helping to
provide a source of plausible hypotheses to be tested, and I
provide three such hypotheses elsewhere (Fitch 2011a).
But unless treated skeptically, tested and thoroughly inte-
grated with empirical, comparative research, adaptive
hypothesis generation runs the risk of falling prey to the
Panglossian paradigm caricatured by (Gould and Lewontin
1979).
In the rest of this paper, I will argue that this risk is
particularly great when considering the evolution of the
brain and cognition (Gould 1991; Buller 2005; Richardson
2007). The problem, which is bad enough for morphology,
is compounded by rampant phenotypic plasticity in the
brain. Animal nervous systems are designed for flexibility
and learning. Individuals can achieve novel phenotypic
states that have no direct evolutionary precursors (e.g.
piloting airplanes or playing chess or the cello), building
upon more general, and often ancient, capacities for per-
ceptual learning or motor control. Of course, this simple
fact does not imply that there are no evolutionary
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precursors relevant to understanding brain function in jet
pilots and grand masters. There are a host of extremely
relevant factors, but all of them belong in the category of
pre-adaptive constraints vis a vis airplanes and chess. They
are based on what Andrews and colleagues aptly termed
‘‘exapted learning mechanisms’’, not specifically designed
for piloting or chess (Andrews et al. 2002). Understanding
the structure of such systems requires a thorough under-
standing of the neural constraints on skill acquisition, and
the genetic constraints on brain development, and no appeal
to the adaptive function of chess is necessary or justified.
I presume that the above statement about the primacy of
constraints over adaptation for chess or airplane flight is
uncontroversial. I suggest that this primacy is equally rel-
evant for most other aspects of human cognition, particu-
larly including language, because its evolutionary history is
so short. Many aspects of human spoken language thus
cannot be properly viewed as adaptations to their current
function in language. Instead, they reflect far more ancient
phylogenetic and developmental constraints on cognition
and learning mechanisms, some of them perhaps ‘‘ghosts of
adaptations past’’ broadly shared with many other animals.
This conclusion, if correct, is bad news for the traditional
evolutionary psychology approach, which seeks the phy-
logenetic history of human cognition finetuned to a Pleis-
tocene ‘‘environment of evolutionary adaptedness,’’ or
EEA. Rather, the history of evolutionary adaptation for
human cognition must extend back to the Cambrian, and
right through to the present. As Darwin suggested in the
quote above, we should be prepared for a series of adap-
tations for different functions over our long evolutionary
history from fish to primates. By this model, the human
brain will present a palimpsest of pre-adaptation, exapta-
tion and re-use of old parts for new purposes.
Adaptation and Constraint in the Brain
When we attempt to distinguish adaptations from con-
straints, the nervous system provides some particularly
interesting, and difficult, problems. Organisms can learn,
and the evolved capabilities of any particular species to
do so are constrained by many biological factors. Even
organisms with simple nervous systems have some
capacity to adjust to current circumstances and learn
(Walters et al. 1981). This capacity for conditioning is,
however, tightly constrained by prepotent innate response
capabilities (Levy and Susswein 1999). For example, rats
can learn to associate sounds with shocks, and tastes with
nausea, but not vice versa (Garcia and Koelling 1966).
Indeed, outside of the Skinner box, most organisms have
very clear biases on what they can easily learn, and when
(Breland and Breland 1961). These biases, often grounded
in reliably-developing species-typical behavior (hereafter
termed ‘‘instinct’’) are central to our understanding of the
evolution of learning and cognition.
To what degree do constraints and biases on behaviour,
and proclivities for learning, evolve rapidly, to be honed to
recent adaptive demands (as evolutionary psychologists
argue)? To what degree is the human instinct to learn
language an adaptation for language per se, rather than
motor skill learning, culture acquisition or general cogni-
tive ability? I believe that human cognitive and linguistic
capabilities rest, for the most part, on an ancient shared
basis, and thus that the role of phylogenetic and develop-
mental constraints has been drastically underestimated in
much of the recent work on language evolution, and human
cognition more generally.
My argument rests on the fact that many ancient adapta-
tions exist in the vertebrate nervous system that allow it to
‘‘wire itself’’ in ways that are highly functional for the indi-
vidual, but are not adaptations of its species. The neural cir-
cuits that result from this self-wiring process may be very
specific to aspects of language (speech production or per-
ception, syntax parsing, semantic processing, or even reading
or writing) without themselves being adaptations for these
tasks. I suggest that many components of modern language
processing fall into this category, and thus that many of the
constraints on human languages actually result from ancient
neural and cognitive constraints that preceded language,
evolutionarily. Additionally, those aspects of human cogni-
tion that are unique to our species, and that evolved as recent
adaptations, may play an important role in non-linguistic
cognition as well, such as social cognition, music or tool-
making. To the extent that these non-linguistic behaviors
played a selective role on the evolution of that ability, it is also
misleading to term them ‘‘adaptations for language’’.
Unfortunately, as is already clear from the examples above,
there is little hope, with current techniques, of uncovering the
facts of the matter about such past selective forces.
The bleak outlook for understanding past selection
stands in sharp contrast to our ever-increasing power to
understand developmental mechanisms and phylogenetic
constraints from a comparative, empirical viewpoint. Thus,
to the extent that these arguments are correct, we should
abandon fruitless arguments about whether ‘‘language is
an adaptation’’ (Fitch et al. 2005; Pinker and Jackendoff
2005). We should replace them with data-driven discus-
sions about the specific mechanisms that allow language
processing, and with empirical investigations of the con-
straints on those mechanisms.
Cognitive ‘‘Adaptations’’: Evolutionary
and Ontogenetic Sources
Comparative work on a diversity of animal species will be
crucial for answering the latter two questions. Above, we
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saw that quadrupeds forced to walk on their hind limbs
from a young age develop skeletal characteristics similar to
those of humans epigenetically. These clearly represent
developmental adjustments to unusual circumstances.
While ‘‘adaptive’’ in the normal English sense of helping
the animals to walk bipedally, such ontogenetic changes
are not adaptations to bipedalism in the Darwinian sense.
Of course, the developmental flexibility allowing bones to
grow in various appropriate ways, depending on develop-
mental circumstances, is adaptive. But we must clearly
distinguish the evolutionary process by which this general
functional process was achieved, from the phenotypic
outcome it led to during bipedal ontogeny. If we are to
designate that generative, developmental process an
adaptation, we must also specify what it is an adaptation
for, and this is where the problems begin. Without a
detailed historical account of how such a flexible system
evolved, and the reasons that flexible organisms prevailed
over less flexible ones, we will be unable to do so.
Might developmental flexibility always be favored? Is
flexibility simply a goal towards which evolution always
strives? This seems unlikely: some species are more flex-
ible than others, and specialist species often evolve from
generalists. The elaborate specialized beaks of Darwin’s
finches provide a nice example (Grant 1986), as does the
history of mammalian evolution in the Tertiary, with ant-
eaters, sloths, rhinos and dolphins evolving from an
ancestral mammal that was a rat-like generalist (Simpson
1949; Ji et al. 2002). Often, it seems, specialization is
favored over generalism, and we cannot assume generalists
(or generalist brain development) as a default.
Flexibility in nervous system development also varies
considerably across clades. The nervous system of many
invertebrates develops in a pre-determined fashion, with
identifiable neurons, essentially identical across individu-
als, playing the same role, making the same connections,
and expressing the same genes. Such fixed, identified
neurons do not exist in the human brain, or in vertebrate
brains in general. The vertebrate brain develops through a
more flexible and interactive epigenetic process, typified by
exuberant growth and overproduction followed by experi-
ence- and situation-dependent pruning (Purves and Licht-
man 1980; Brown et al. 1991). This neural developmental
process has been evocatively termed ‘‘neural Darwinism’’
(Edelman 1987), and constitutes a more flexible alternative
to the pre-determined development typifying some inver-
tebrate clades. Although neural epigenesis shares certain
characteristics with the evolutionary process, they obvi-
ously must be distinguished: evolution is about changes in
whole populations, while ontogeny involves changes in an
individual. We expect nervous development, at least in
vertebrates, to produce many circuits that are well-tuned to
the individual organism’s environment, but we do not
expect each of these to be an adaptation in the Darwinian
sense.
Consider frog vision. Frogs have essentially separate
visual fields for each eye, with a fully crossed optic chiasm
and no overlap between the two retinal projections. In
contrast, in cats, monkeys, or humans, who have a large
binocular overlap, the visual projections arrange the con-
tribution of each eye into adjacent alternating ‘‘dominance
columns’’ from the left and right eyes. Frogs normally
show no such striping, because each optic tectum has
projections from one eye alone. But if a third eye is
experimentally grafted onto a tadpole’s head, during
metamorphosis the third eye sends novel axonal projec-
tions which overlap those of one or both normal eyes. An
epigenetic process of competition leads to a self-sorting of
the two eyes into non-overlapping regions. At adulthood,
such three-eyed frogs show optical dominance columns,
like those of binocular mammals (Constantine-Paton and
Law 1978). The three-eyed frog develops dominance col-
umns as a side-effect of a general, Hebbian process of
vertebrate brain self-wiring.
Let us now ask whether optical dominance columns are
an adaptation for binocular vision. Certainly in the frog
they are not: such columns only occur in the laboratory
after eye transplants, in a species that normally lacks bin-
ocular vision, so such columns can hardly have been
selected for. In the cat or human, the answer is not so clear.
The frog example suggests that the general capacity to
form dominance columns was present in our pre-binocular
vertebrate ancestors, and simply anatomically rearranging
the eye locations would have been sufficient for dominance
columns to emerge in the brain. This does not, of course,
rule out the possibility that other, more fine-grained fea-
tures of optical dominance columns are adaptations for
binocular vision. But the developmental process that gen-
erates dominance columns cannot, itself, be termed an
adaptation for something it predated by millions of years.
At best, the Hebbian process of self-sorting might be
termed a ‘‘pre-adaptation’’ for binocular vision (taking
pains to strip this term of any connotation of foresight on
the part of natural selection). More perspicaciously, we
might adopt Gould & Vrba’s term ‘‘exaptation’’ for the
process by which the capacity to develop dominance col-
umns was exploited, evolutionarily, by binocular animals
like cats or people. Then the question is whether, after this
exaptive event, any further fine-tuning occurred. If so, it
would be the fine-tuning, rather than dominance columns
themselves, that would correctly be termed an adaptation.
To the relevance of this example to human language,
consider the brain circuits involved in reading and writing.
Writing is clearly a recent cultural development. Alpha-
betic writing appears to have been invented only once in
the history of our species, a few thousand years ago. Given
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this short timespan, modern human abilities to read and
write can hardly be considered adaptations. Nonetheless,
there are several reports of a fascinating condition termed
alexia without agraphia (‘‘pure alexia’’), in which a brain-
damaged patient loses the ability to read but retains the
ability to write. Such patients can write individual words,
and even take dictation, but afterwards are unable to read
what they have written. General visual and manual abilities
remain intact. Although rare, this syndrome has been repeat-
edly reported in the neurological literature (Geschwind and
Kaplan 1962; Geschwind 1970), and similar cases have
been reported for written music (Brust 1980). Alexia
without agraphia provides a cautionary tale for those
tempted to assume that specific brain ‘‘modules’’ are
adaptations. Finding a discrete brain region or circuit whose
destruction impairs reading, but leaves writing intact, is
no demonstration that these skills represent genetically
determined, functionally specialized adaptations.
The processes of neural development, skill acquisition
and learning (in some suitably broad sense) all clearly
enable our brains to fine-tune their structure and compu-
tational behaviour to the tasks we face. As a result, the fact
that some particular mechanism is well-suited to the per-
formance of a particular task, in the adult brain, is not itself
evidence of adaptation. These facts greatly complicate any
reverse engineering approach to cognitive capabilities, for
the details of the mechanism, however ‘‘functional’’, do not
provide unambiguous indications of past adaptive history.
Without a detailed understanding of the neural develop-
ment of such functions, we simply cannot know whether
the source of ‘‘good design’’ is evolutionary (adaptation to
past selective processes) or ontogenetic (developmental
tuning to problems faced by the individual organism). In
most cases, both will play a role, and thus the function of
any given circuit will represent multiple layers of adapta-
tions and constraints, from many different evolutionary
epochs, including adaptations, ‘‘ghosts of adaptations
past’’, and current ontogenetic history. In some cases (such
as reading and writing) we expect there to be no truly
adaptive component at all. In many others (such as music)
it is very difficult to say. In the case of language, we can
confidently state that the possession of language is bene-
ficial to any contemporary human, and has been so for
millennia, but this does not allow us to say which aspects
of language are targeted adaptations (much less what
function they served in a Pleistocene EEA), and which are
simply exaptations, or correlated traits resulting from the
rich history of constraints borne in every mammal or pri-
mate brain.
In summary, the previous sections show that, for any
given neural circuit or cognitive mechanism, considerable
research is required to know whether it constitutes an
adaptation for the task(s) it is used to perform. Indeed,
profitable inquiry will require that we refrain from dis-
cussing whole mechanisms as adaptations. Instead, we
need to treat finer aspects of cognitive mechanisms, and
particularly novel aspects of these mechanisms, as potential
adaptations. Just as we can treat the length of the giraffe’s
neck, but not its vertebral count, as an adaptation for
browsing, we can ask whether certain aspects of syntax
processing or speech production are adaptations for lan-
guage, but not the mechanism as a whole. Syntax pro-
cessing surely piggybacks upon ancient perceptual
mechanisms, just as speech production must build on a
prior foundation of motor control circuitry. Those boot-
strapped neural/cognitive precursors are not themselves
adaptations for syntax or speech (cf. Fitch 2011a).
Language Evolution: Saltation, Continuity and Pre-
Adaptation
Clearly, discussions of adaptation in language evolution
require us to distinguish cognitive adaptations from con-
straints on precursor mechanisms. As a step in this direc-
tion, Kazuo Okanoya (Okanoya 2007, 2010) has helpfully
outlined three common perspectives on language evolution,
depicted in Fig. 3, which he dubbed ‘‘naı¨ve evolutionist’’,
‘‘punctuationist’’, and ‘‘pre-adaptationist’’ viewpoints. The
figure schematically represents changes that led to lan-
guage during recent human evolution (since our last com-
mon ancestor with chimpanzees, roughly six million years
ago).
Naı¨ve Evolutionist: The first perspective stresses conti-
nuity in a communication system over human evolu-
tionary history. Although the ‘‘precursor’’ system is
typically considered to be primate vocal communication
(e.g., Hockett and Ascher 1964; MacNeilage 1998;
Dunbar 2003), many scholars have argued instead for
continuity in gestural communication (Hewes 1973;
Armstrong et al. 1995; Corballis 2003; Arbib 2005;
Tomasello and Call 2007). But in all cases, the idea is
that this precursor system became richer and more
elaborate, gradually approaching the complexity of
modern human language, with no abrupt changes or
truly novel features being posited. Those advocating
such models often cite the unyielding gradualism
championed by Darwin in support of their viewpoint.
Punctuationist: The second perspective stresses the
differences between language and all other known
communication systems, and posits a saltationist bio-
logical origin for these novel features (e.g., Berwick
1997; Tattersall 1999; Chomsky 2010). From this
perspective it is pointless to seek the precursors of
language in vocal or gestural communication, since the
computations underlying language are of a wholly
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different sort and are not tied to any particular output
modality. Indeed the origin of these features may have
been in the context of private thought, rather than having
anything special to do with communication (Chomsky
2010). While this punctuationist perspective does not
deny the many areas of biological continuity between
humans and other animals, it singles out certain aspects
of language that seem truly novel, and seeks to explain
them discontinuously. It should be noted that there is
nothing anti-evolutionary in such a perspective, and
there is a long tradition in evolutionary biology of
seeking discontinuous origins for novel traits (e.g.,
Bateson 1894), and some of these ideas are being
profitably reinterpreted in modern terms (cf. Gould
2002).
Pre-Adaptationist: This perspective is favored by
Okanoya, who assumes a multi-component approach to
language evolution, involving recent innovations in
signal, syntax and semantics. Increasingly, scholars
interested in language evolution appear to be moving
away from either extreme pole of continuity or saltation,
to acknowledge the likelihood that some aspects of
language are best treated as continuous developments or
elaborations of ancient traits shared with other species
(e.g. vocalization), while others may constitute true
novelties that arose since our divergence from chimpan-
zees (e.g. recursive syntax). This possibility is obviously
inherent in a multi-component perspective on language:
as soon as one accepts the necessity for multiple
different biological mechanisms underlying modern
language, the possibility that they have separate, and
perhaps quite different, evolutionary histories follows
naturally. A core feature of this multi-component
perspective is that it denies any one feature of language
as central, but instead posits that language required a
confluence of multiple mechanisms, each on of which
may have had quite different precursors in our pre-
linguistic ancestors. Okanoya has dubbed the perspective
that focuses on this confluence of features, diagrammed
in Fig 3C, the ‘‘pre-adaptationist’’ viewpoint.
The key question, from this perspective, is: how did our
ancestors move from a species whose vocal communica-
tion system consisted of a set of biologically-given calls
capable of expressing a small fraction of what the organism
knows, to the nearly unbounded system of expression that
we humans take as our birthright? One immediate question
this raises concerns speech, and particularly vocal learning.
Since all modern humans use speech, in the auditory/vocal
domain, as the default output signal, we need to ask how
humans evolved this capacity for vocal learning, which
characterizes humans and not other apes (Nottebohm 1975,
1976; Janik and Slater 1997). But posing this question
makes no assumptions that the ‘‘core feature’’ of language
is vocal or spoken, or that there is any necessary connec-
tion between language and ape vocal communication.
Indeed, Okanoya’s pre-adaptationist perspective gives
equal weight to mechanisms underlying complex syntax
and semantics, stressing that all of these factors had to
come together in human evolution to yield spoken lan-
guage. The major advantage of Okanoya’s perspective is its
clear recognition that, for human language to be possible,
multiple factors had to fall in place.
Multiple Origins of ‘‘Universal Grammar’’
Okanoya’s pre-adaptationist perspective invites a profitable
re-interpration of the concept of Universal Grammar in
terms of biological constraints. There is a long tradition in
linguistic research of referring to the constraints on the
system children use to acquire language as ‘‘Universal
Grammar’’ (Chomsky 1965, 1990; Montague 1970;
Bierwisch 2001; Nowak et al. 2001; Jackendoff 2002;
Yang 2004; Fitch 2011b), and an almost equally long tra-
dition of vehemently rejecting this term (Deacon, 2003;
Tomasello 2005; Van Valin 2008; Chater et al. 2009;
Evans and Levinson 2009). A decade ago we (Hauser et al.
2002) suggested that one reason that this debate has raged
so long, and with so little resolution, is that different people
take the term ‘‘language’’ to designate different things. We
further suggested that by identifying the many aspects of
language that do have precursors or relatives in other
species (termed the ‘‘faculty of language in a broad sense’’
Fig. 3 Three Schematized Approaches to Language Evolution The
‘‘puctuationist’’ approach posits a trait appearing de novo, without
functionally-relevant precursor traits; the ‘‘naı¨ve evolutionist’’ per-
spective assumes evolutionary continuity of function, and gradual
expansion of the trait; the ‘‘pre-adaptationist’’ perspective posits a
novel recombination of pre-existing traits, perhaps with expansion
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or FLB), we can employ the comparative approach to
explore these aspects of language. Finally, we suggested
that the set of components of language constituting true
novelties, unique to both our species and to language, is
quite small. We dubbed this set the ‘‘faculty of language in
a narrow sense’’ or FLN, and hypothesized that it is per-
haps limited to linguistic recursion, or possibly even an
empty set. In plain words (cf. Fitch et al. 2005), this means
that most of what has been hypothesized to be part of
‘‘Universal Grammar’’ is part of the FLB and derives from
older mechanisms (e.g. constraints on general cognition) or
processes (e.g. constraints on neural development), rather
than being novel to either humans or language.
I would like to make this exaptationist proposal more
explicit, since it has frequently been misinterpreted (cf.
Fitch 2011b). Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch proposed that
most aspects of language have precursors or related
mechanisms in other species (and are thus part of FLB).
Many such cognitive mechanisms, although important for
language, result from more general developmental and
epigenetic processes, evolved long before language or
humans arose. In other cases, as for optical dominance
columns in three-eyed frogs, traits might appear in lan-
guage that have no obvious equivalents in other species,
but nonetheless result from shared developmental mecha-
nisms (the evo-devo component of this proposal). In any
case, many constraints will operate on the modern human
language system that have deep roots, and we will be
unable to understand how language operates, or why it
developed the way it did, without a rich understanding of
these previous constraints. This perspective on the bio-
logical origins of evolutionary constraints on syntax has
recently been persuasively embraced by (Chomsky 2010),
making explicit reference to the traditional ideas about
constraints discussed above. But it is in no sense incom-
patible with the notion that many important components of
language are adaptations, in some sense. Rather, this per-
spective requires a broadening of the explanatory hypoth-
eses considered, and a concomitant sharpening of the
evidential basis for explanatory arguments (cf. Andrews
et al. 2002; Botha 2011).
Conclusion: Novel Components of Language Result
from a Cascade of Exaptations
I conclude by attempting to draw these various strands
together to offer a slight modification and elaboration of
Okanoya’s pre-adaptationist perspective, which I dub
‘‘exaptationist’’. The main difference is that, rather than
conceiving of all the component mechanisms of modern
language as already being present pre-linguistically in the
LCA, albeit in reduced form, I suggest that a cascade of
innovations was required, each one creating the pre-con-
ditions for the later ones to be functional and adaptively
favored. This conception is illustrated in Fig. 4. The main
difference from the pre-adaptationist viewpoint (Fig 3C) is
a more explicit focus on the sequence in which various pre-
adaptations were put to use, and an emphasis on a
sequential cascade of exaptations. At each stage of this
sequence, a new system of ‘‘protolanguage’’ arose, with its
own features and useful in its own right, but lacking others
that are present today. In each of these stages, some chunks
of pre-existing biology was co-opted or ‘‘hijacked’’ and put
to new use. Each exaptive event created a new set of
selective pressures on subsequent hominids, leading to the
cascade of exaptations that yielded our present full
language.
I have argued that at least three different sets of novel
abilities, in the domains of vocal signaling, syntax, and
semantics, had to evolve in the six million years since our
evolutionary history diverged from that of other apes (Fitch
2005, 2010). While different scholars may emphasize one
or the other of these features, the comparative data make
clear that all three sets of innovations differentiate us from
chimpanzees, bonobos, and our other ape cousins. Any of
these three may represent a true novelty, in the sense of a
‘‘key innovation’’ (Liem 1973) or ‘‘breakthrough adapta-
tion’’ (Lovejoy 1981) that lacks precursors and makes a
central difference to subsequent evolution. For example,
vocal learning certainly represents a key innovation for the
production of speech or music. However, it has extensive
convergent parallels in other vertebrates, at least some of
which share underlying developmental mechanisms (Fitch
2009a). Similarly, human recursive syntax may be quan-
titatively superior to the basic combinatorial mechanisms
observed in sign-trained chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh
et al. 1993), but still build upon these as precursors.
Alternatively, unbounded Merge may represent a true
novelty with no computational precursors (Chomsky
2010), but one that still inherits more general constraints on
neural development that structure its functions, and limi-
tations. But in each case some plausible homologs or
analogs exist, and it seems premature to decide such points
without further investigation.
The exaptation cascade perspective makes no commit-
ments to the particular order in which different mechanisms
were exapted and selected. To illustrate this, Fig 4b and 4c
contrast the ‘‘musical protolanguage’’ hypothesis of Darwin
with the ‘‘gestural protolanguage’’ hypothesis of Condillac,
Hewes and many others (Darwin 1871; Condillac 1747/
1971; Hewes 1973). The first model stresses a discontinuity,
between vocal learning and the lack thereof, as an early
event in language evolution. The second stresses a conti-
nuity, between gestural communication in apes and humans,
as the scaffolding for innovations in symbolic and syntactic
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systems, with vocal learning as a later and relatively
inconsequential innovation. The differences between these
two models are explored in detail elsewhere (Fitch 2010)
and will not be discussed here. The point is simply that one
can adopt the exaptationist perspective without making any
premature commitments about what exactly was exapted, or
in what order.
From this exaptationist perspective, the crucial ques-
tions in language evolution concern:
(1) Novelties: What cognitive abilities needed to evolve
since our divergence from chimpanzees?
(2) Mechanisms: What genetic, developmental and neu-
ral/computational mechanisms underlie these
abilities?
(3) Precursors: How are these mechanisms related to pre-
existing mechanisms, both in function and develop-
ment? What constraints do they inherit from those
precursors?
(4) Interactions/Synergies: How do these novel mecha-
nisms interact with each other, and how do they
exploit and interact with other, unchanged mech-
anisms?
(5) Computation: What computational and algorithmic
function(s) does each mechanism serve, in the present
day, and to what extent are these computational
functions shared, either with precursor mechanisms,
or more broadly with other species and other aspects
of cognition?
The question ‘‘is mechanism x an adaptation?’’ is absent
from this list, because the over-simplistic sense of ‘‘adap-
tation’’ often deployed in discussions of cognitive evolu-
tion (where traits either are, or are not, adaptations) is of
very limited use in discussing language evolution. My
omission is not due to any hostiliy to the concept of
adaptation by natural selection: like any biologist I see
adaptation as a key component of evolutionary explanation.
Rather, my skepticism results from a respect for adaptation
as a concept, and a recognition of acute limitations on our
scientific ability to validate that concept in the case of
human cognitive abilities. If it is difficult to tease out and
understand the target of selection in the case of morpho-
logical adaptations like bipedalism or our vocal tract,
where the physics and physiology are well-understood,
how much more challenging will that same question be for
cognitive traits, where neither the basic computational
issues nor the adaptive problem space are well understood.
Although we can certainly hope for progress on the five
issues above, questions about adaptation may remain for-
ever intractable. If this is correct, the cognitive sciences as
a whole will be well-served by a continued focus on
mechanisms, precursors, and computational function
(which, after all, represents the current norm). Interest in
cognitive evolution should lead to a broadening of per-
spective, more fully embracing comparative cognition.
This will enable scientists to better delineate and under-
stand the many constraints on cognition and learning that
we have inherited.
A B
Fig. 4 a Schematic View of Exaptation in Synergy with Adaptation:
the figure illustrates how a novel trait (indicated by the star) can arise,
but then interact with preexisting continuing adaptations, to generate
a new synergistic trait which is different from either trait. LCA Last
common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans b Two Views of
Protolanguage as an Exaptive Cascade: the figures illustrate two
hypotheses about a ‘‘protolanguage’’ stage during the evolution of
human spoken language. On the left, the gestural origins hypothesis
posits a gradual expansion of gestural capacities already present in the
LCA into a more elaborate gestural protolanguage, with the later
addition of vocal learning creating modern spoken language. The
musical origins hypothesis posits an early ‘‘key innovation’’ of vocal
learning, in the service of song, which provides an early musical
protolanguage; this is later combined with continuous cognitive and
gestural components to create modern spoken language
632 Evol Biol (2012) 39:613–637
123
Focusing on empirically inaccessible questions of
adaptation, as advocated by some evolutionary psycholo-
gists, simply diverts attention from these central empirical
objectives. Questions about adaptations should of course
continue to be asked: they may provide an enlightening
(and entertaining) source of intuitions and new hypotheses.
But, for reasons that I hope are now clear, such questions
are unlikely to be answered definitively. In stark contrast, I
think that the questions listed above can, and should, be
answered via increased empirical research. In doing so we
will reach a much deeper and more satisfactory under-
standing of language and its evolutionary origins, one
which incorporates the many complex constraints on
development, and avails itself of the richer and more plu-
ralistic perspective on evolution that has been so beauti-
fully unveiled by the last two decades of developmental
research.
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